PROMISING PRACTICES IN ENGAGING YOUTH IN PEACE AND SECURITY AND P/CVE

Summary of key interventions and examples

THE CHALLENGE

The small but persistent number of youth who are involved in conflict and targeted to join extremist groups demonstrates that current approaches to peacebuilding, conflict mitigation, and preventing or countering violent extremism (PVE/CVE) must be reevaluated. Rather than focusing on maximizing short-term security efforts, evidence shows that long-term community-based development initiatives that address the complex push and pull factors causing a small minority of youth to engage in violence can actually increase youth voices, contribute to PVE, and strengthen youth participation in peacebuilding.[1] The 2015 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 (SCR 2250) on Youth, Peace and Security and emerging literature emphasizes the need to switch the narrative to recognize youth as positive agents for peacebuilding and security, rather than stigmatizing them as risks. SCR 2250 encourages governments, international organizations, and civil society to actively engage youth populations as partners in shaping peace and security

processes and implementing promising practices related to comprehensive, community-based solutions so that they may have greater peace dividends.

This document seeks to identify best practices, bright spots, and possible opportunities for their replication with more of a focus on PVE/CVE. It operates under the hypothesis that youth engagement in positive alternatives to violence should be maximized in order for peace writ large to take hold.

DEFINING THE CURRENT APPROACH

The definitions and interpretations of violent extremism as well as peacebuilding and security may differ by context. USAID follows the US government definition of CVE as *"proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate*

violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence. This includes both disrupting the tactics used by violent extremists to attract new recruits to violence and building specific alternatives, narratives, capabilities, and resiliencies in targeted communities and populations to reduce the risk of radicalization and recruitment to violence." [2] Overall, USAID focuses much of its work on a development approach to countering violent extremism, while other US government agencies tend to focus more on counter-insurgency and security-focused measures. While these programs incorporate aspects of youth-led and community-based approaches, they tend not to specifically require the use of a Positive Youth Development (PYD)[3] approach. A recent systematic review of PYD in LMICs[4] found that, out of 108 studies included in the systematic review, only 30 focused on violence and 30 focused on youth capacity building and civic engagement. The study also found that few programs self-identify as using a PYD approach, even though they meet the definition of PYD. Applying a PYD approach can build youth skills in active community decision making and connecting youth with community role models and mentors.

Other work involving youth in peace and security includes gang-violence-reduction programs, engaging youth in post-conflict situations, and promoting the inclusion of youth in political, economic, and cultural realms. In the area of gang-related-violence prevention, the inclusion of the public health approach and comprehensive community- or place-based responses, which diagnose levels of vulnerability to the epidemic of violence and aim to pair the appropriate response to an individual's level of risk, have shown promising outcomes.

UNDERSTANDING LOCAL AND COUNTRY CONTEXT AND DRIVERS

Violent extremism has no borders, religion or ethnicity; yet, areas of poverty, unequal access to resources and opportunities, and political instability are breeding grounds for many of the push factors guiding youth

About the cover image: In Honduras, the Proponte Más program uses family trees to teach young people about their own roots—what ties them to families and communities—which can be the start of a support system that lowers their risk of becoming involved in gangs and violence. - Image courtesy of the Proponte Más program

towards extremist groups. PVE/CVE programming is made more complex because there is no typical youth demographic and motivations for joining extremist groups vary across regions. Research shows that the three key drivers pushing youth to engage in violent activities are injustice, *discrimination,* and *violence*; however, it is important to dig deeper to understand how these concepts manifest within different contexts.[5] Drivers are highly nuanced from community to community and region to region: a comprehensive analysis of drivers is crucial for developing the appropriate violence-prevention strategy.

Examples of push factors

The Global Terrorism Index separates push factors between OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and non-OECD countries, but it is important to remember that these are generalizations:

- *Youth in OECD countries:* The dominant push factors stem from socio-economic factors, such as: injustice, youth identity, corruption, early marriage, youth unemployment, confidence in the press, faith in democracy, drug crime, and attitudes towards immigration.

- *Youth in non-OECD countries:* Push factors stem from a history of armed conflict, grievances, ongoing conflict within the country, corruption and a sense of injustice, lack of opportunity or services in under-governed areas, weak self-identity, and a weak governance environment.[6]

Many aberrations exist: for example, most of the perpetrators of the 2016 attack at the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka, Bangladesh, came from upper-middle-class families, had private education, and were well connected. However, we also know that bullying and racism against minority and immigrant youth in the US and Europe can be motivating factors for marginalized youth. In the Global South, a sense of injustice is more likely to manifest from corruption or political exclusion.

Examples of pull factors

Pull factors may include peer and family recruitment, opportunity for resources and recognition, and ability to validate use of violence.

Understanding the diversity of pain points across youth populations and the localized context is critical for developing comprehensive solutions that properly

address the myriad of problems young women and men face across the globe. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) notes: *"Experts believe that radicalization is the result of a complex overlap of concurring and mutually reinforcing factors, unique to each context and, to a certain extent, each individual. The process of radicalization begins with changes in self-identification due to grievances, frequently driven by personal or group concerns regarding local issues as well as international events. A grievance is understood to create the sense of alienation or disenchantment that provides a cognitive opening for radicalization."*

Similarly, for youth who are vulnerable to gang recruitment, drug use, criminality, or other illicit activities, program evidence suggests that, like VE, many youth turn to these anti-social behaviors because they bring a sense of meaning, belonging, and recognition.

Finally, it is important to note that many youth who participate in violent extremist groups have not necessarily been radicalized; they participate for material reasons, including personal and/or familial safety, a stable income, or the promise of marriage. As noted above, the complex factors are overlapping, diverse, and individualized.

STEPS TO EFFECTIVE PROGRAMMING ON YOUTH, PEACE, SECURITY AND PVE/CVE

Because there is not yet any overarching guidance on engaging youth in peace and security initiatives, we are faced with the challenge of applying a **youth lens** to existing guides to programming in PVE and any other peace and security challenges. For example, USAID's report, "Development Assistance and Counter Extremism: A Guide to Programming," identifies six steps to help practitioners identify drivers of extremism in order to determine the appropriate strategy. A comprehensive PYD approach may offer valid alternatives to meet similar needs of meaning, belonging and recognition, outlined above. Recent developments in systems thinking and complexity-aware-development principles are especially promising for peacebuilding and PVE interventions, because causal pathways to violence are not linear, not replicated, and not generally understood except in hindsight. [7]

When using this guide, it is critical to apply a **youth lens** to understand from their perspective the role that local governance, institutions, and other actors play in shaping the drivers of VE, community violence, and conflict.

The six programming steps
1. Determine the characteristics of the VE or violence phenomenon in the setting being analyzed.
2. Assess whether prevention or mitigation is the main task and whether recruitment, community support, or an enabling environment that permits VE or violent groups to operate are the most pressing concerns.
3. Identify which populations, geographical areas, and/or institutions are particularly vulnerable and why.
4. Ascertain those social processes and group dynamics that are critical to facilitating or undermining recruitment and/or community support.
5. Determine the political, socioeconomic and cultural drivers (especially those affecting youth) at work and assess their salience after reviewing the analysis in Steps One through Four.
6. Prioritize drivers and locations, and determine development assistance and strategic communications interventions. This may entail a further step of a Threat Assessment Matrix template (featured in the USAID report) for the practitioner to identify the type of drivers.

What does it mean to apply a youth lens to these steps? The answer can take many forms throughout the program cycle.

Possible ideas include:
- Involving youth in the design of assessment questions, data collection, analysis, and reporting.
- Identifying credible youth to speak to other youth in their terms (using slang and neighborhood dialect and adhering to localized gender norms) rather than relying on the most educated youth from the capital city.
- Ascertaining which youth are peer influencers and building capacities for youth to be positive role models with their peers.

PROMISING PRACTICES: PROGRAMMATIC MODELS AND INTERVENTIONS

While there is still a great deal to learn about engaging youth in peace, security, and PVE/CVE, and each context requires a unique evaluation, a number of promising practices exist from successful programs across the globe. The following is a list of promising and evidence-based best practices to prevent youth from engaging in extremist activities and build resilience through positive

participation. Each practice has been organized into four categories, following the format of the **Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violent Extremism and Promote Peace**, and offers several associated program examples. It must be noted that the most effective programs use a combination of interventions presented below.

PREVENT VIOLENCE AND RECRUITMENT INTO VIOLENT GROUPS		PROMISING & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES
National Development Planning & Youth Policy	• Incorporating youth into national development planning strategies and developing national youth policies are broad-scale mechanisms that act as a critical element for laying the groundwork for all initiatives that encourage peacebuilding through youth empowerment. [8] • Engaging youth to design policy at the local and national level and carrying out corresponding action plans is key to creating both a sense of agency and a voice that deters extremism and empowers social inclusion.	2011-2016 South Sudan Development Plan and 2009-2014 South Africa National Youth Policy both exemplify youth-oriented and youth-influenced national development policies to empower youth and prevent their entry into extremist groups. The youth-led Youth Against Violence Movement in Central America carried out hundreds of community youth consultations in developing national and regional policy recommendations. This movement was part of USAID's **Crime and Violence Prevention Approach** that also was found to be highly effective at reducing the murder rate and reducing the number of youth loitering and joining gangs.
Youth Leadership Trainings	• Investing in training youth leaders of marginalized communities, with an emphasis on peacebuilding practices, is shown to create positive youth role models that are prepared to mitigate conflict in their communities. [9] • Supporting long-term leadership initiatives that are youth-led, connected to youth organizations, and create practical learning experiences for youth are the most effective. • Training programs work best when linked to follow-up-action opportunities.	The **Kosovo Young Leaders Program** worked with diverse youth communities through a phased approach that features (1) job entrepreneurship, (2) civic engagement training, and (3) conflict prevention. These phases were followed by engaging Albanian and Serbian youth leaders to implement joint projects. Thus far, 2,483 participants have received trainings, 27 community projects have been developed and both adults and youth reported increased understanding of issues around youth ethnic groups. The **Young African Leaders Initiative** is another example of a multi-tiered approach to building capacity and network support across the continent and has reached over 300,000 young people.
Gender-Focused Programming	• There is a need to focus on the pull factors created by early and forced marriage and long-term deficits of girls lacking equal access to education. • Violent extremist and terrorist groups often target women and girls for gender-based violence, including abductions, forced marriages, sexual violence, forced pregnancies, attacks on women human rights defenders and leaders, attacks on girls' access	Since 2011, the UK's counterterrorism strategy has included a gender focus. Examples of their prevention efforts include the Birmingham City Council that funds projects such as "Big Sister," which highlights "successful Muslim females in order to make local role models more accessible to thousands of Muslim girls in Birmingham." They have also created a "Women and Youth PVE Awareness Project" in their Bangladeshi community. USAID's **Mali Shared Governance Program**, which focused on increasing women's participation in planning and budgeting for community activities, was critical in strengthening community resilience.

PREVENT VIOLENCE AND RECRUITMENT INTO VIOLENT GROUPS		PROMISING & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES
	to education, and restrictions on their freedom of movement.	
Training Youth Community Leaders in Conflict Prevention	• Enhancing youth's conflict mitigation skills as well as pride for their community and culture has been shown to increase social cohesion and address issues of community conflict and well-being.[10] • Promising practice components have included models where youth from conflicting groups are trained together as facilitators.	The **Youth Against Terrorism** program is a Tunisian youth nonprofit advocacy organization focused on building a society immune from violence, radicalization and terrorism. Their work has improved community-policing and training of police in community relations. Additionally, they have revised curricula manuals at the 1st and 2nd level to increase focus on critical thinking and peaceful tenets of Islam. The **Peace through Development II** program in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger worked to build a cadre of nearly 3,500 local youth leaders across 45 communes. Trained youth were effective in engaging their peers and promoting non-violent means of address conflict. In USAID's **Mali Shared Governance Program**, MSI worked in 84 communes to train women and youth to effectively engage elected officials and leaders on development issues. Following the coup in 2012, MSI supported the establishment of 25 steering committees, composed of community and religious leaders, women, and youth, to lead conflict-resolution efforts. The committees successfully led 227 community conflict resolution activities on sensitive issues, including religion and politics.
Youth-led Organizations	• Providing technical support and capacity building to youth-led organizations creates authentic young leaders that are prepared to encourage peacebuilding, counteract conflict and advocate for youth oriented projects.[11]	**PRONI Institute of Social Education/FSB: Balkans** established year-long courses on youth leadership, conflict transformation, and voluntary community youth work with students. This program was conducted in coordination with developing peer groups at 40 youth-led youth centers that had nearly 15,000 members. In addition to running the centers, the youth ran their own youth bank, which was used to support youth voluntary projects.
Youth Civic Engagement	• Building opportunities for youth to develop a sense of purpose and meaning through civic engagement increases their sense of self-efficacy, leading to resilience.	The **Somalia Youth Leadership Initiative** study found that, although the provision of secondary education through the SYLI program reduced the likelihood of youth participating in violence by 16%, it increased support for political violence by 11%. However, the combination of both secondary formal education and civic engagement reduced the likelihood of youth both participating in (by 13%) and supporting (by 20%) political violence. **Yes, Youth Can**, a three-year program in Kenya with the goal of addressing the underlying social, economic, and political factors that drive youth political and social marginalization, found that the use of community members as "mobilizers" was an important factor that positively affected youth participation and engagement. It also had

PREVENT VIOLENCE AND RECRUITMENT INTO VIOLENT GROUPS		PROMISING & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES
		an impact on the participants' scores on the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale, used to measure self-esteem and self-confidence.
Employability, Entrepreneurship & Life Skills Program	• Structured programs that teach vocational and soft skills to ensure that youth have the self-awareness and aptitudes to seek meaningful employment, in combination with job placement, are shown to be critical elements for PVE/CVE programming.[12] • Recent research by YouthPower Learning found that the five most important soft/life skills positively impacting outcomes in violence prevention programs are: social, empathy, self-control, self-concept, and higher-order thinking skills.	USAID's **Somali Youth Livelihood Programs** focused on livelihoods, skills training, and economic opportunities for youth. The program served over 10,000 youth, 87% of whom completed the program and 78% were placed in jobs. Stakeholders agreed that the program prevented youth from entering destabilizing activities. In South-East Asia, the COMET project enabled teachers to better prepare youth for employment by studying labor gaps in the STEM+AT fields and training universities/ vocational centers in these areas. In the **Peace through Development II** program in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger, youth who received vocational training also received start-up kits and localized entrepreneurial training that allowed them to better manage their new finances or business.
Focus on Mental Health	• Bodies of neuroscience research now demonstrate that youth undergo brain development up until the age of 25.[13] • Supporting at-risk youth to be conscious of their biases and decision-making processes, as well as to learn impulse control through cognitive behavioral therapy, has been found to help decrease impulsivity and decision-making difficulties amongst troubled youth.[14]	The **Sustainable Transformation of Youth in Liberia** program was a short-term Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT) program targeting high-risk young men in Liberia to reduce destructive behaviors, such as criminality and substance abuse. Evaluation by MIT's Poverty Action Lab found that those who received therapy were 55% less likely to carry a weapon in the short term and recipients reported a long-term reduction in impulsivity. CBT is found to be one of the most effective therapies in youth violence prevention in USAID's evaluation of what works in reducing community violence in Latin America.

FACILITATE YOUTH DISENGAGMENT FROM VIOLENT GROUPS		PROMISING & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES
Driver Analysis and Shortlisting Program Components	• To avoid a one-size-fits-all approach, a scan of the drivers of violent extremism should be conducted through localized research that takes into account structural motivators, individual incentives, and enabling factors. • Drivers should be matched with proven PVE/CVE responses. For example, the individual incentive	The 2014–2015 EU-funded **Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism** program in Nairobi identified at-risk youth for mentorship through a series of workshops and interviews to understand their different drivers and if these could be addressed through a mentorship program. USAID's **Mid-term Evaluation of Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa** is an excellent example of conducting a drivers analysis in a specific country context to determine appropriate programming.

FACILITATE YOUTH DISENGAGMENT FROM VIOLENT GROUPS		PROMISING & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES
	driver of "revenge" could be addressed by messaging initiatives, support for moderate religious leaders, civic and peace education, or psychosocial support.[15]	
Community-led Disengagement	• Initiatives to disengage youth from violent extremist activities are found to be most effective when led by other youth, former violent extremists, religious leaders, and parents who have their own experiences.[16]	The Elman Center for Peace and Human Rights in Somalia partnered with the Minister of Internal Security to comprehensively disengage, rehabilitate, and reintegrate imprisoned children and youth (ex-combatants, extremists, or military defectors). Since the launch of the program, 3500 youth have registered as alumni.
Engaging Families of Youth	• Engaging families, particularly mothers, is recognized to play an important role in PVE/CVE. • Recommendations include strengthening family-based social networks, encouraging families to work with authorities, empowering mothers as prevention protagonists, and supporting family development of VE prevention.	In Germany, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugee Affairs is recognized for its successful public-private initiative with a network of NGOs to manage a hotline for families of youth engaging in VE. Families could call in to voice their concerns and receive family counseling to de-radicalize youth. Since 2012, they have received over 1500 calls and counseled over 420 families, demonstrating that they are reaching their target.[17]

ESTABLISH MEANINGFUL PARTNERSHIPS		PROMISING & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES
Enhance Cooperation with Religious Leaders	• Engagement of religious leaders and institutions is found to be an extremely important entry point for championing peacemaking and conflict resolution. [18] • Training religious leaders to work with youth can support counter radicalization.	The USAID-funded **Garissa Youth Program** is a program for Somali youth in Northern Kenya that teaches skills training and civic engagement. In their evaluation, engagement with religious leaders was noted as one of the driving factors for the program's success.
Sports for Development and Peace	• Using sports as a vehicle to teach peace and conflict resolution and leadership skills is a relatively recent but promising approach to engaging vulnerable youth. • ntentional and behavior-based messaging and skills development woven into broader sports (or cultural) activities has been shown to be key to successful programs. [19]	**Peace Players International** demonstrates that youth who play together can learn to live together. Their leadership development program trains youth in conflict resolution, life skills and coaching. A recent study found that youth who are trained as coaches have reduced levels of prejudice and more likely to exhibit conflict-mitigating behaviors. (Source: UN Practice Report, p. 49)

ESTABLISH MEANINGFUL PARTNERSHIPS		PROMISING & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES
Inter-generational Dialogue	• Incorporating intergenerational dialogues into leadership programs helps to give young people positive role models to learn from and share with as an alternative to violence and crime. These models also can address issues of youth voice, grievance, and variance in narratives.	The **Becoming a Man** program run by Youth Guidance and World Sport Chicago ran a comprehensive program in Chicago's public schools that included interactions with pro-social adults, in combination with after-school programming, social policy intervention, and CBT. Evaluation of the model found that this programming led to a short-term decrease in crime-related activities and had a large impact on educational outcomes such as graduation. In USAID's **Peace through Development II program**, intergenerational dialogue was cited by participants as key to reducing the social exclusion felt by youth in the Sahel.

PRODUCE AND AMPLIFY NEW NARRATIVES		PROMISING & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES
Engage Youth in Governance	• Ensuring representation of youth in policy-making processes through the creation of youth councils is critical to creating a political outlet for youth sentiments as well as to serve as a branch for advocacy.	Search for Common Ground's **Empowering Young Change Makers in Tunisia** supports the creation and capacity building of youth leadership councils to give them tools to work within the political processes to advocate for their communities. Their mid-evaluation shows progress in collaboration between youth and government officials.
Youth-Oriented Communica-tions Strategies	• Media gives youth an opportunity to share knowledge and overcome exclusion. • Engage youth to use media as a means to support policies and programs and as a vehicle for peacebuilding.[20] Other key lessons from recent USAID-supported projects include the strength of positive messaging over counter-messaging, especially through radio and online platforms that are most utilized by youth in key areas.	US Institute of Peace initiative **Salam Shabab** (Peace Youth), an Iraqi reality youth-run TV series, has Iraqi teens compete to be peace-building ambassadors. Winning international awards, Salam Shabab has been found to be successful at providing youth with a platform to express themselves and engage in peacebuilding. **Peer to Peer** has mobilized university students around the world to develop and execute campaigns and social media strategies against extremism that are credible and authentic to their peers. USAID's **Peace through Development I and II** programs found promising results in their peace and tolerance-focused radio programs, including radio soap operas targeting youth. The project also found "for youth, by youth" participatory theater and mobile cinema to be effective in addressing delicate subjects in rural areas.
Sustained Dialogue Initiatives	• Programs that facilitate inter-group contact between youth in conflict, combined with long-term sustained dialogue initiatives, are found to significantly decrease the likelihood of participants joining extremist groups and create positive shifts in attitude towards the other.[21]	**Seeds of Peace** summer camps bring together Palestinian and Israeli youth leaders to engage in long-term dialogue discussions in safe and nurturing environments. A study by the University of Chicago finds that participants have greater positive atti tudes towards one another after programming and no participants joined extremist groups later.

PRODUCE AND AMPLIFY NEW NARRATIVES		PROMISING & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES
Reshaping Youth Indentities through Opportunities	• Research shows that it is critical to understand how the formation of identity, particularly social identity, relates to violent behavior. [22] • Changing the narrative on youth in their society can help to provide opportunities for youth to be productive members of society, thus decreasing the likelihood of radicalization.	Mercy Corp's **Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace** project worked to promote stability in Kenya by engaging youth through economic opportunities and strengthening local mechanisms for conflict resolution. Their mid-term evaluation found that youth who engage in collective action are seen as more trustworthy by adults and then are provided with more opportunities to be productive.
Spaces for Expressiveness	• Creating both physical and virtual environments for at-risk youth to express their opinions and have their voices recognized empowers youth to be agents of change in their communities. [23] • Youth centers create communal environments for trainings, dialogue, and educational and civic engagement activities. [24]	UNICEF's 17 **Youth Centers** in Kyrgyzstan were found to positively change negative attitudes and stereotypes of youth's capacity to be change makers. Nearly 80% of youth from high-conflict areas who participated in this project were connected to employment.

DATABASES & WEBSITES

1. Devex-Youth Will (https://pages.devex.com/youth-will.html)
2. D/ME for Peace (http://dmeforpeace.org/)
3. Global Center on Cooperative Security (http://www.globalcenter.org/?s=youth)
4. Hedaya Center (http://www.hedayahcenter.org/publications/89/report)
5. J-Pal Poverty Action Lab (https://www.povertyactionlab.org/crime)
6. Network for Youth in Transition (http://networkforyouthintransition.org/forum)
7. Search for a Common Ground: ILT Toolkits (https://www.sfcg.org/tag/ilt-toolkits), Reports (https://www.sfcg.org/tag/ilt-reports), and Evaluations (https://www.sfcg.org/ilt/evaluations/)
8. Youth4Peace (https://www.youth4peace.info/featured-resources)
9. United States Institute for Peace-Resolve Network (http://www.resolvenet.org/research-library/)
10. United States Institute for Peace (https://www.usip.org/search/apachesolr_search/youth?site_kewords=youth)
11. YouthPower Learning: Research and Evidence (http://www.youthpower.org/resources/sector/youth-2317/resource-type/research-and-evidence-536?page=1)

GUIDES & TOOLKITS

12.   2015 Amman Youth Declaration on Youth, Peace and Security (http://unoy.org/wp-content/uploads/Amman-Youth-Declaration.pdf)

13.   Development Assistance and Counter Extremism: A Guide to Programming (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadt977.pdf)

14.   Guiding Principles on Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding (http://unoy.org/wp-content/uploads/Guiding-Principles.pdf)

15.   Homeland Security Institute's Recruitment and Radicalization of School Aged Youth by International Terrorist Groups (https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c664/9103b3d86b13fa58b2c1a2942b5b7ada91d7.pdf)

16.   Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity (http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/preventing-violent-extremism-through-promoting-inclusive-develop.html)

17.   Six Ways to Successfully Engage Youth in Peacebuilding (https://www.devex.com/news/6-ways-to-successfully-engage-youths-in-peace-building-85577)

18.   Surveying CVE Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement and Deradicalization Programs (https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_SurveyingCVEMetrics_March2016.pdf)

19.   Understanding Youth Radicalization - a Psychosocial approach (http://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/11/understanding-youth-radicalization-in-the-age-of-isis-a-psychosocial-analysis/)

20.   UN Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security (http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Final%20Report%20-%20Global%20Forum%20on%20Youth%20Peace%20%20Security%2011.11.2015.pdf)

21.   UN Resolution 2250: Youth Toolkit (http://unoy.org/2250-toolkit/)

22.   USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadt978.pdf)

23.   USAID State of the Field Report: Examining the Evidence in Youth Education in Crisis and Conflict (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaec085.pdf)

24.   USAID What Works in Reducing Community Violence (https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf)

25.   What We Know about "What Works" in Youth Civic Engagement and Voice, Youth Organizations, Youth Leadership, and Civic Education DRAFT (https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/summary_of_findings_from_youth_and_drg_research_project.pdf)

26.   Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violent Extremism and Promote Peace (https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-Youth-Action-Agenda-1.pdf)

27.   Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note (http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Practice%20Note%20Youth%20&%20Peacebuilding%20-%20January%202016.pdf)

ENDNOTES

[1] "White House Action Agenda (2015); USAID, USAID Policy: The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency (Washington, D.C., 2009), p. 4.

[2] "Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism." USAID and Department of State. (Washington, D.C., 2016) p.4

[3] USAID's PYD approach "engages youth along with their families, communities and/or governments so that youth are empowered to reach their full potential. PYD approaches build skills, assets and competencies; foster healthy relationships; strengthen the environment; and transform systems".

[4] See, "Systematic Review of Positive Youth Development in Low- and Middle-Income Countries," commissioned by USAID through the YouthPower Learning project

[5] "Youth & Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice and Violence." (Mercy Corps, 2015). p 26

[6] "Global Terrorism Index: 2015." (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). p 86

[7] "Complexity-Aware Monitoring Discussion Note (Brief)." USAID, 2016.

[8] "Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note" (United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development et. al, 2016): 22

[9] "Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note" (United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development et. al, 2016): 27

[10] Hedaya and Global Center on Cooperative Security. (Feb 2015) "Thinking Outside the Box: Exploring the Critical Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preventing Violent Extremism: p 3

[11] "Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note" (United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development et. al, 2016): 30

[12] What Works in Reducing Community-based Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study for the Northern Triangle. (USAID, 2016). p 17.

[13] "The Adolescent Brain: New Research and its Implications for Young People Transitioning from Foster Care" (Jim Casey Youth Opportunities Initiative, 2011). p 44.

[14] State of the Field Report: Examining the Evidence in Youth Education in Crisis and Conflict: USAID Youth Research, Evaluation, and Learning Project." (USAID, 2013). p. 20.

[15] Khalil, Dr. James and Martine Zeuthen. "Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction." Whitehall Reports (RUSI, 2016). p 3.

[16] Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violent Extremism and Promote Peace." (Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism, 2015) p 2.

[17] (See page 133 on Family Counseling, Radicalization and CT).

[18] Reisman, Lainie and Gustavo Payan. "Turning Away from MS-13 and Al Shabaab." Analyzing Youth Resilience in Honduras and North-East Kenya. (EDC, 2015): p 9

[19] Hedaya and Global Center on Cooperative Security. (Feb 2015) "Thinking Outside the Box: Exploring the Critical Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preventing Violent Extremism: p 4

[20] "Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note" (United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development et. al, 2016): p 50.

[21] "A Teacher's Guide on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Schools" (UNESCO, 2016): p 18

[22] "Preventing violent extremism through promoting inclusive development, tolerance and respect for diversity." (UNDP 2016) Global Meeting 14-16 March 2016 in Oslo, Norway: 47

[23] De Vos, Manola. "6 Ways to Successfully engage youths in peacebuilding." (Devex, 2015): p 1-2

[24] "Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note" (United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development et. al, 2016): p 33